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IL ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Heredia's Claim that He
Received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
1.

Mr. Heredia established an issue of fact as to whether he received effective
assistance of counsel with respect to entry of his guilty plea

Mr. Heredia was reluctant to plead guilty to murder but understood from his attorney that
under the plea agreement he faced a maximum of thirty-five years in prison. R. 358. After the
change of plea hearing, Mr. Heredia came to understand that the plea agreement involved a
recommendation for a minimum of thirty-five years and he moved to withdraw his plea. Id.
Because Mr. lferedia presented an issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to ensure that he fully understood the plea agreement, the district comi erred in
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
Echoing the findings of the district court, the state asserts that Mr. Heredia failed to
present non-conclusory evidence that he was coerced by his attorneys. Respondent's Brief, p.
10-11; Tr. p. 67, ln. 21 - p. 68, In. 3. However, during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his

plea, 1 Mr. Heredia clarified that he was not asserting his guilty plea was coerced within the legal
definition of that word and, instead, that he believed he had to respond correctly during the
change of plea hearing. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. l 44, ln. 15-24.
The district court also found that Mr. Heredia's assertion that he did not understand the
tem1s of the plea agreement was contradicted by the record because the district court infonned
Mr. Heredia of those terms during the plea colloquy. However, the fact that the district court

1

Post-conviction counsel specifically relied on the motion to withdraw guilty pica
proceedings to establish this claim. Tr. p. 38, ln. 15 - p. 39, In. 5.

l

correctly described the terms of the plea agreement in open court does not disprove that Mr.
Heredia misunderstood those terms. Indeed, Mr. Heredia did not even wait until being sentenced
to attempt to rectify his misunderstanding and instead moved to withdraw his plea as soon as he
realized he misunderstood the sentencing recommendations.
Nor is it that difficult to believe that Mr. Heredia, who is relatively young and lacks any
legal education,2 understood that the phrase "fixed portion of 35 years" and "cap the fixed
portion" referred to a sentence of no more than thirty-five years. Also lending credibility to Mr.
Heredia' s misunderstanding, Mr. Heredia testified that he rejected an offer that his attorn\y had
conveyed which included a sentencing recommendation of 25 years to life because he did not
want to agree to a life sentence recommendation. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 80, In. 15-22. Mr. Heredia
acknowledged that he understood that the judge had the authority to reject the state's
recommendation and sentence him to life in prison but believed the state was going to ask that he
spend no more than 35 years in prison. See Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 88, In. 13; p. 89, In. 3; see also p.
100, In. 13-21 (Mr. Heredia believed his attorney would ask for 10 years and the state would ask
for 35 years and the judge would decide). Mr. Heredia also clarified that his satisfaction with his
attorney's performance was based on his belief that the state was going to recommend a
maximum sentence of35 years. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 98, In. 12-19; p. 102, In. 12-20.
Moreover, Mr. Heredia had potential defenses to the specific intent element of firstdegree murder, which he would have asserted if he had truly understood the plea agreement. See
Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 128, In. 4 - p. 130, In. 14. Accordingly, Mr. Heredia established a reasonable

2

Undersigned counsel can recall several conversations with defendants and their families
with similar backgrounds to Mr. Heredia's who did not understand the interplay between the
detern1inate and indeterminate portions of a sentence despite having the issue explained to them.
2

possibility that he would not have pied guilty if his attorney had not convinced him to accept the
plea agreement without fully explaining its terms.
The district court also erred in finding that the change of plea hearing established that Mr.
Heredia had no defenses to first degree murder and that Mr. Heredia's testimony could not be
reconciled with his assertions on post-conviction. Initially, the district court itself acknowledged
that Mr. Heredia had potential defenses to first-degree murder but found that those defenses had
been waived by the guilty plea. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 171, In. 1-3. Additionally, Mr. Heredia's
testimony at the change of plea hearing can be reconciled with his assertions on his motion to
withdraw his plea and in the post-conviction action.
Specifically, Mr. Heredia's testimony established that he was present during the shooting,
that he knew that the group planned to kill Jessie and that he was not physically forced into
accompanying them. Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 21, In. 13 - 23. This testimony is not necessarily is
inconsistent with Mr. Heredia's assertions during post-conviction and on his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Mr. Heredia testified that in December 2006, he was drinking and using
methamphetamine. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 82, In. 13 - p. 83, In. 2; p. 85, In. 6-10. During a three-day
period around the 15 th of December, Mr. Heredia smoked methamphetamine hourly and drank
approximately 20 beers each day. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 83, In. 3-13; p. 85, In. 6-10. Mr. Heredia
became paranoid and began seeing things, including clowns, that did not exist. Tr. (1-31-2008)
p. 83, In. 19 - p. 84, In. 5; 101, In. 13-17. This information regarding Mr. Heredia's state of mind
is not inconsistent with the plea colloquy.
Mr. Heredia also testified that he accompanied the group because he believed the brothers
would harm him or people he knew ifhe did not. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 84, In. 18 - p. 85, In. 16;
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101, In. 20 - 102, In. 8. The fact that no one was actively threatening Mr. Heredia at that time he
accompanied the group as testified to during the plea hearing does not mean he did not fear
reprisals at later time if he did not go along. Regardless of whether Mr. Heredia had a true
coercion defense, his beliefs could have negated that he had a specific intent to aid and abet in
the murder.
Mr. Heredia established an issue of fact as to whether trial counsel performed deficiently
by convincing Mr. Heredia to enter a guilty plea without ensuring that he fully understood the
tenns of that agreement. But for Mr. Heredia's misunderstanding of the plea agreement, he
would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Accordingly, the district
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

2.

Polygraph

Trial counsel failed to explain to Mr. Heredia that the polygraph could be used against
him and that Mr. Heredia might fail the test even if he was truthful. R. l 4 l-42, 166-68. Because
Mr. Heredia established an issue of material fact as to whether his attorney's failure to fully
advise him of the potential ramifications of a polygraph constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
The state, like the district court, contends that Mr. Heredia could not have been
prejudiced by his attorney's failure to fully explain the risks of the polygraph because he was
advised of his Miranda rights prior to submitting to the polygraph. However, as explained in Mr.
Hereclia's Opening Brief, the cursory and general advise accompanying Miranda warnings
cannot replace the full discussion with counsel regarding the negative ramifications of the
polygraph that should have taken place. The district court therefore erred in concluding that Mr.

4

Heredia's Miranda waiver precluded prejudice from counsel's performance.

B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hercdia's Claim that He
Received Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Heredia argued that the

waiver of his appellate rights did not extend to his right to appeal the district court's decision on
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr. p. 43, In. 16-22; p.

In. 17-23. The district court

concluded that whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to confer with Mr. Heredia
regarding the appeal was moot because Mr. Heredia waived his right to appeal in the plea
agreement and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal based on that waiver. Tr. p. 71, In. 8 - p.
72, ln. 9.
The district court erred in so ruling because an appeal from the denial of the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea draws into question the guilty plea itself. Thus, the term of the plea
agreement by which Mr. Heredia agreed to give up his right to appeal should not be construed as
precluding his ability to appeal the district court's refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea.
The state's response to this argument is that Mr. Heredia has presented the issue for the
"first time on appeal." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. However, as described above, Mr. Heredia
specifically argued to the district court "we are asking the court to consider ... whether or not it
is reasonable and enforceable, or certainly intended bYthe parties, that that waiver of appeal
rights would extend to the defendant's right to appeal from the court's denial of his motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. Tr. p. 43, In. 9-25.
Accordingly, the state is incorrect in its assertion that Mr. Heredia's argument concerning
appellate counsel is being raised for the first time on appeal. Further, although Mr. Heredia's

5

arguments at the summary judgment hearing concerning his appellate counsel claim differed
from the way the issue was presented in the post-conviction relief petition, the state should be
estopped from objecting to any variance in this appeal.
As the state correctly notes, Mr. Heredia's amended petition for post-conviction relief
claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not confer
with him regarding the issues to be presented on appeal and did not challenge the use of the
polygraph results in sentencing. However, prior to argument on the state's motion for summary
judgment, post-conviction counsel informed the district court that there was an error in the
petition with respect to the appellate counsel claim and:
I have discussed that error with [the prosecutor]. It accurately sets forth the issue
for this court's consideration but incorrectly sets forth the issue that was set forth
in the notice of appeal that went to the Idaho Supreme Court. Specifically, the
issue that did go up to the Supreme Court was, in fact, whether or not the trial
court had erred in denying the defendant's motion to set aside or withdraw his
guilty plea. 3 Again, I apologize for that error; but again, we need to make the
record clear there.
Tr. p. 13, In. 14-18.
The state then argued that the appellate counsel claim should be dismissed because the
appellate court had already held that the appellate waiver justified dismissal of the appeal and,
thus, "anything appellate counsel did or didn't do or did or didn't add to the list of items to be
appealed, the state believes is irrelevant by operation of law" and the plea agreement. Id. at p.

3

As noted in Mr. Heredia' s Opening Brief, the parties representation of the issue
presented in his direct appeal was inaccurate and a review of this Court's file reveals that the
only issue presented was whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr.
Heredia - an issue squarely precluded by the plea agreement. Appellant's Brief, Docket No.
35367, filed January 15, 2009. The state then filed a motion to dismiss which appellate counsel
did not oppose.
6

31, In. 1-25. Post-conviction counsel responded:
It is clear, as indicated by [the prosecutor], that the petitioner waived his right to
appeal based upon the plea agreement in this case as well as a recitation of the
court at the time of the change of plea hearing. What we are asking the court to
consider is whether or not it is reasonable and enforceable, or certainly intended
by the parties, that that waiver of appeal rights would extend to the defendant's
right to appeal from the court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

Id. at p. 43, In. 9-25.
Counsel distinguished Mr. Heredia's situation from the typical scenario involving an appellate
waiver and argued that Mr. Heredia's misunderstanding regarding the terms of the agreement
was not contemplated when plea agreement was entered. Id. at p. 44-46. Counsel urged:
And so, again, ... Your Honor, ... the only issue is to the waiver of appellate
rights as to whether it was the intent of the parties, that it would extend to a
subsequent motion by the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and essentially
start over, that is, rescinding the plea agreement, and then from that attempted
recision of the plea agreement, he attempts to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

Id at p. 4, ln. 16-25. In rebuttal the state reiterated its position that whether appellate counsel
effectively raised the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea on appeal was irrelevant because
the Supreme Court had already dismissed the appeal based on the waiver. Id. at p. 55, In. 2-24.
The state did not object to Mr. Heredia's formulation of the appellate counsel claim or
point out that the issue was being argued in a different manner than presented in the petition.
Indeed, it appears that the parties discussed how the issue would be presented prior to the hearing
and the state then responded to the issue as formulated by Mr. Heredia at the hearing. The state
cannot participate in presenting a claim to the district court differently then it was formulated in
the pleadings and then claim that the issue is precluded from consideration on appeal because it
was not properly presented. See Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 900, 204 P .3d 532, 540
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(Ct. App. 2009) ("judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position"); see also
I.R.C.P. 15(b) ("when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings"); State
v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) ("the doctrine of invited error
applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the
commission of the error).
Based on its position in the trial court, the state's incorrect claim that Mr. Heredia's
argument pertaining to appellate counsel was "not raised below" is not well-taken. The state has
not offered any response to the substance of Mr. Heredia's arguments and, thus, no reply is
warranted.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Heredia's Opening Brief, Mr. Heredia
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing his
application for post-conviction relief and to remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

_3
__ day of April, 20 I

By Robyn-- Fyffe
Attorney for Mr. Fredy Heredia-Juarez
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